Theory and practice by Nam, Sung-wook
INTRODUCTION
The landmark June 15 inter-Korean summit was all the more
dramatic and meaningful , given North Korea’s unresponsive
attitude in the past. Politically, Seoul’s consistent “sunshine policy”
certainly contributed to changes in the North. More importantly,
however, it appears that the dire economic situation in the North
played a large role in shifting North Korea’s stance.
Ever since the 1990s, Pyongyang has experienced enormous
economic hardship. This was in large part due to the collapse of the
former Soviet Union and the East European Communist bloc, as well
as the ever-increasing inconsistencies in the Socialist regime. Faced
with difficulties greater than they expected , North Korea
desperately needed external assistance, especially from South Korea.
Consequently, it became a national priority for the North to improve
its relations with the South, while strengthening the ideological
education of its citizens. In the year 1999, the North recorded a
positive growth rate of 6.2 percent for the first time in nine years,
thanks to aid provided by South Korea and the international
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community.
Under these circumstances, it became very important for the two
Koreas to create a form of economic cooperation that would be
beneficial to both the South and the North. In other words, both
sides needed to share the view that cooperation, rather than
unilateral assistance, would best serve the interests of both sides. It
seemed that the most desirable form of economic cooperation was
the exchange of production factors in which each side had relative
advantages. Seoul and Pyongyang would have to combine the
South’s capital and technology with the North’s labor and land,
produce internationally competitive goods and then divide the
profits. Simply selling South Korean products or introducing
capitalist service industry in North Korea would not be feasible,
since North Korea does not have markets for such economic
activities due to lack of capital. The idea of North Korea selling its
goods to South Koreans would be even more unfeasible considering
the poor quality of North Korean made products. 
Given this fact, the most ideal and realistic form of economic
cooperation for both South and North Korea would be to construct a
special industrial complex in which goods would be jointly
produced by the two sides. To ensure the success of such economic
cooperation, the industrial complex should be located in an area
where an efficient distribution system could be put in place within a
short period of time. Here, an efficient distribution system would
necessitate the relatively easy establishment of social infrastructure
and the low cost transport of produced goods to the South. 
As National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il has
shown great interest in developing an industrial complex ,
constructing an industrial park as a means of inter-Korean economic
cooperation stands an excellent chance for success. After Chairman
Kim’s secret visit to China on January 15, North Korea experts
forecast that there is a good possibility that North Korea will adopt
reform and open-door policies. And they point to the Kaesong area
as a likely starting point. While in China, Chairman Kim Jong-il
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spent four days in Shanghai and Pudong, rather than in Beijing. In
Shanghai, a symbol of China’s reform and open-door policy, Kim
toured the Stock Exchange, and IT facilities––as well as the Japanese
chipproducer NEC, and GM, American automotive giant. His visit to
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the so-called “flower of capitalism,”
indicates his realization of the fact that bringing change to the North
is an inevitable choice.
Based on his tour to Shanghai and Pudong , Kim Jong-il is
expected to introduce a new type of development model in North
Korea. If he decides to pursue a full-scale economic opening, entirely
different from the Rajin-Sonbong special economic zones, which
ended in failure, Kaesong will most likely be the venue. What
distinguishes Kaesong from Rajin, Sonbong or Shinuiju is its
proximity to capitalist regions and other diverse favorable conditions
that could make it possible for it to become a successful economic
special zone comparable to Shanghai or Shenzhen. Kim will face an
uphill battle to devise a thorough plan that does not repeat the
mistakes of the Rajin-Sonbong projects. He will concentrate his
efforts on drawing up a well-organized development model that can
match the one at Pudong.
INTER-KOREAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION: PAST AND PRESENT
The idea of inter-Korean economic cooperation was first
broached at a press conference on August 20, 1984 by former South
Korean president Chun Doo-hwan. At that time, President Chun
proposed that the North begin trade and economic cooperation with
the South, expressing his willingness to offer, if agreed to by the
North , free technology and goods which would contribute
substantially to improving the standard of living of North Korea’s
citizens. During the period between September 29 and October 4,
1984, aid for flood victims were transported from the South to the
North via the truce village of Panmunjom, and the ports of Inchon
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and Pukpyong. 
After that, Seoul proposed to Pyongyang that a permanent body
be set up to deal with matters related to inter-Korean trade and
economic cooperation and to hold inter-Korean economic talks in
which government and private-level economic delegations from each
side would participate. In a message from the Deputy Premier of the
State Administration Council on October 16 , 1984, the North
responded positively to the proposal, saying it would hold economic
talks with the South.
Subsequently, five rounds of South-North economic talks were
held at the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom,
starting from November 15, 1984. However, on January 20, 1986, the
North Korean delegation unilaterally announced its decision to
postpone indefinitely the sixth round of meetings, citing as the
reason, the ROK-U.S. team spirit military training. As a result, the
bilateral economic talks were halted.
Economic exchanges between the two Koreas was reestablished
in the early 1990s. At the sixth round of high-level talks held in
Pyongyang in February 1992, the two sides signed the Inter-Korean
Basic Agreement, and the subsidiary agreement on exchange and
cooperation was adopted in August.
The Kim Young-sam government adopted a very generous
approach toward North Korea in its early days, as evidenced by the
provision of 150,000 tons of rice to the North in 1995. Nevertheless,
this approach did not bear much fruit due to strained inter-Korean
relations that were exacerbated by Pyongyang’s nuclear program
and the submarine infiltration incidents. In accordance with the
government’s policy of linking North Korea’s nuclear issue to inter-
Korean economic cooperation, only trade-on-commission and simple
exchanges of goods were allowed, while joint investment projects
were strictly prohibited. As a consequence, economic cooperation
was pursued on a very limited scale. 
The Kim Dae-jung government has, however, adopted a policy of
engagement toward the North and promoted its vision of building a
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national economic community through active inter-Korean economic
cooperation. This policy was clearly reflected in last year’s June 15
Joint Declaration, which envisioned the balanced development of the
North and the South.
As of the end of 2000, the volume of inter-Korean trade stood at
$425.15 million, an increase of $90 million from 1999 ($333.44 million
in total: $121.6 million in exports and $211.83 million in imports),
exceeding the $400 million mark for the first time. Such volume
accounts for only 0.6% of South Korea’s total trade in 1999, whereas
it amounts to almost 22.5% of North Korea’s total trade. For the past
decade, from 1991 to 2000, the North recorded a surplus of $115
million per year in its trade with the South. In particular, North
Korea recorded a surplus of around $50 million in the year 2000 from
inter-Korean trade even excluding monies from South Korean aid,
the Mt. Kumgang tourism project and construction of light water
reactors. What is notable is that processing-on-commission trade
reached $140 million in volume, a 32.6% of increase compared to
$99.62 million in 1999. The processing-on-commission trade
accounted for a staggering 53.5% of total trade between the South
and the North, which was around $228.5 million. At the end of 2000,
a total of 18 cooperation projects were under way and the number of
companies involved in the processing-on-commission trade reached
almost 140. Moreover, many South Korean companies are exploring
business opportunities in the North, particularly the Mt. Kumgang
tourism project and the manufacture of textiles, footwear and
electronics. These would benefit both the North and South, combining
the cheap labor of the former and technology of the latter.
Nevertheless, the imbalance of the trade structure remains a
problem. Even after ten years, inter-Korean trade is still handled in the
form of simple exchanges of goods and limited trade-on-commission.
Besides, there are other problems such as high distribution costs, an
uncertain business environment, lack of North Korea’s purchasing
power, lack of business information, poor social infrastructure and the
absence of a proper legal and institutional framework.1)
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CHINA’S ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND IMPLICATIONS 
REGARDING NORTH KOREA
Factors behind the Success of Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen and 
Pudong
China decided to open its economy to the outside world and
boost its domestic economy at the 3rd plenary session of the 11th
Central Committee of the Communist Party held in November 1978.
Launching economic reforms, it allowed enterprises to do business
without government intervention, rationalized prices and adopted a
socialist commodity economy. As for external economic policy,
China abandoned its isolationist policy to actively induce loans from
other countries, international financial institutions and foreign
private banks, to establish special economic zones and attract foreign
investment.2)
As part of its strategy to open up its economy, China pushed for
establishment of special economic zones, departing from its past
approach of developing the country on its own. Special economic
zones are referred to as government-designated areas that are open
to investment by western countries. These areas were designed not
only to draw foreign investment but also to introduce advanced
technology. 
Furthermore, domestic companies were allowed free competition
in the area and could engage in such economic activities as obtaining
capital, raw materials, machinery and labor, and selling and
disposing of their commodities without government intervention.
The designation signaled that the Chinese government officially
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1) The Federation of Korean Industries, “How Far Have South Korean Companies’
North Korea Projects Progressed,” CER-99-33 (August 1999)
2) Park Jung-dong, China’s Modern Economy (Seoul: Bubmoon Publishing Co., 1993),
p.9.
recognized special zones for commodity economy.3) Between July
1979 and October 1980, four cities were selected as special economic
zones, namely Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province
and Xiamen in Fujian Province. Since then Dalian and Tianjin, in the
northern part of the country, have become special zones, followed by
Hainan in April 1988 and Pudong in September 1990. As a result, there
are now a total of 14 special economic zones, in China, among which
Shenzhen and Pudong have achieved remarkable progress.
Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s reform and opening,
embarked on what was seen as his last achievement, the Pudong
Development Project. The Pudong project transformed that zone into
Asia’s Manhattan. Located in the heart of Shanghai, a significant port
serving inland China, Pudong covers 522 km2. It consists of four
development blocs; the Waigaoqiao bonded area, the Lujiazui financial
and trade bloc, the Jinqiao export and processing bloc and the
Changjiang high-tech development bloc. Seventy of the world’s 500
top companies have established a presence in Pudong and their
investments amount to $30 billion.
Will North Korea Adopt the Chinese Model in Developing Its Special
Economic Zones?
It has been 20 years since China began to build its special
economic zones. Since then they have enjoyed rapid progress and
comprehensive changes, including burgeoning revenues, success in
attracting foreign investment, wider opportunities for employment,
earning of foreign currency and higher living standards. It is
noteworthy that the Shenzhen special economic zone has made
remarkable progress. Its revenues had skyrocketed by 100 times and
its foreign currency earnings by 20 times as of 1999, compared to
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3) Kim Ha-ryong, “Characteristics and limitations in China’s Reform policy,”
Socialist Reform and North Korea (Seoul: Asia Research Institute, Korea Univesity,
1992), p.85.
those of 1979 when it first opened to the outside world. Such drastic
economic development transformed Shenzhen from a small fishing
village into one of China’s major industrial cities. On the other hand,
there have been some downsides in the formation of special zones.
Speedy industrialization and urbanization have replaced traditional
industry and agriculture. In the commerce sector, even though the
quality of services improved following diversification of distribution
routes and facilitation of private businesses, crimes such as
smuggling and monopolistic sales practices have emerged.4)
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the Chinese strategy to
construct special economic zone has been a success. China is a
country with a population of 1.2 billion, an immense territory, a high
population growth rate, a wide disparity between rich and poor and
a socialist political system. Given the complicated variables, there
was no alternative to the special economic zone project for China if it
was to develop its economy to a certain level in a short period of
time. China was able to open its economy gradually under strict
government controls, while retaining its political system. The success
of the strategy is attributable to well-planned reform programs, a
huge domestic market, rich natural resources, immense land area
and the extensive capital resources of ethnic Chinese residing
abroad.
North Korea’s circumstances are quite different to those of
China, so there are bound to be question marks over whether North
Korea can achieve economic development through the establishment
of a special economic zone. North Korea has a small land area, scarce
resources, a 50 year-old autocratic system of government, poor
infrastructure, and an uncompetitive labor force. Consequently, from
the investor’s perspective, North Korea with only 23 million people,
would be an unattractive market. Conversely, China was an
attractive market even though the government proposed stringent
conditions for opening, since it had a huge market with 1.2 billion
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people. From the perspective of governance, Beijing was in a better
position for opening since the spillover from the reform process
would be confined to a certain degree, given the vastness of the
country. On the other hand, it is highly likely that capitalism will
spread nationwide once Kaesong is opened to the outside world. If
that happens, Pyongyang will have difficulty in imposing measures
to contain the repercussions. Considering these points, North Korea
will need a perfect plan for the successful establishment of a special
economic zone that will enable them to overcome the country’s
unfavorable conditions and spare them the trial-and-error process
of the Rajin-Sonbong special economic zone project. What is
important is that investments from South Korea and other countries
are essential for devising and implementing the plan. Decisions by
foreign companies on whether or not to invest in the North will
depend on the success of South Korean companies’ investments. In
order to achieve this, the North will have to produce not only the
hardware for the construction of an industrial complex, but also the
software, including decision-making methodology on wages based
on a system that would satisfy South Korean investors.
KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX:
A PROSPECTIVE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE IN NORTH KOREA
Lessons of the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone Project
In 1984, North Korea began to follow the Chinese-style reform
model, initially trying to attract direct foreign investment by
enacting joint venture legislation. The Chinese model, characterized
as “one center and two basic points,” designed to implement a
reform policy aimed at economic development by introducing
capital and advanced technology, while, at the same time, retaining
socialism. Rajin-Sonbong was the first area where this strategy was
applied.
KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 75
North Korea designated Rajin-Sonbong area as a special
economic zone in December 1991. At the time, the North asserted
that the area, abounding with natural resources, would serve as an
entry point linking land and sea, since it bordered on Russia, China
and Mongolia, and faced Japan across the East Sea. They predicted
that as an ideally-located economic center in North Korea, the Rajin-
Sonbong area would attract international interest. Kim Il-sung
expressed his confidence in the prospect of the foreign investment
zone when he talked to the heads of news agencies in Cuba and
Russia, stating that “The area has already stirred foreign investors’
great interest due to its economic potential and favorable location
and many countries desire to make investments.”5)
North Korea planned to establish a modernized international
trade center in line with global economic development in the 21st
century. It separated the Rajin-Sonbong area from other areas,
improved the area’s managerial system and facilitated market
functions.6) In essence the North Korean model did not differ from
the Chinese model––at least not from a legal aspect. What then are
the factors that caused the former to fail7) while the latter has been
such a resounding success?
As of 1998, foreign companies from China, Hong Kong and Japan
signed $800 million worth of contracts with North Korea. However,
only 10 percent (approximately $88 million) of the promised
investment was actually made. Furthermore, the investment was
mainly focused on the infrastructure and service sectors, especially
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5) Kim Il-sung University Press, Investment Environment of Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade
Area (Pyongyang: Kim Il-sung University Press, 1995), p. 5.
6) Cho Myung-chul, Economic Relations and Prospective between North Korea and China
(External Economic Policy Institute, October 1997), p. 20.
7) The total investment in the North between 1992 and the end of 2000 recorded less
than $100 million. Compared with $342 million invested into the Mt. Kumgang
tourism project, the total foreign investment amount illustrates North Korea
failed in its bid to draw foreign investment. A total of $942 million will be paid to
North Korea from Novembe 1998 to February 2005.
the communications, hotel, transportation, construction, and tourism
sectors, while investment in the manufacturing sector accounted for
a mere 4 percent as of 1997.
Since 1993, North Korea has held briefings on more than 30
occasions to lure foreign investors in more than ten countries,
including Germany and Hong Kong. In September 1996 and 1998, it
also hosted an investment forum in the Rajin-Sonbong economic
zone, introducing free market elements into the nation. For example,
Pyongyang opened a free market in Wonjungri, allowed private
businesses and reflected real foreign exchange rates. As part of this
effort, the North sent economic delegations to Australia and
Singapore to learn capitalist economic management techniques and
to attract foreign funds––but to no avail.8)
The reasons behind the failed Rajin-Sonbong economic zone are
not so much related to North Korea’s “hardware” as to its national
“software,” which runs through the country’s economic policy. The
course of international capital flow is determined by a thorough
comparison and examination of many special economic zones and
free trade areas all over the world. North Korea does offer incentives
to prospective foreign investors, but overall, it falls short of their
expectations. A host of political obstacles coupled with the passive
and rigid attitudes of North Korean workers stand in the way of
facilitation of business activities. In addition, the non-existence of a
consumer market , poor infrastructure in transportation and
communications, and consequently, high logistics costs, are all
factors that discourage investors. These negative factors need to be
removed if the Kaesong Special Economic District is to be successful. 
Background of the Kaesong Industrial Complex Project and the Reality
A. Basic plans
On August 10, 2000, Hyundai announced on agreement with
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North Korea selecting Kaesong for development as an industrial
complex and designated it a special economic district.9) Hyundai
plans to develop the city of Kaesong, 70 km from Seoul and 160 km
from Pyongyang, as an industrial complex spanning about 20 million
pyong (6.05 million square meter) to house companies mainly
engaged in light industry. The company expects that its development
of Kaesong may have spillover effects: restoration of severed South-
North railways and roads, and contribution to the development of
neighboring communities, job creation, and promotion of exchanges
of technology and foreign currency earnings through export. As part
of its long-term strategy, the South Korean conglomerate is planning
to build a multi-functional city, catering to international trade,
tourism, manufacturing, commerce, and housing. It will function as a
center for the market economy and as a free economic zone as well.
(See Table 1)
For this purpose, Hyundai plans to lease land rights for more
than 50 years in order to develop the Kaesong area into an industrial
complex, and then to sell it both Korean and foreign enterprises. The
plan divides the 8 million pyong (2.42 million square meter) of land
into three sections that will be developed gradually in three phases
from the year 2001 to 2008.
The criteria by which the first 1 million-pyong industrial park
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9) In June 1998, Hyundai agreed to develop an industrial park on the west coast
area with North Korea’s Association of National Economic Cooperation. In
October 1999, Hyundai’s honorary Chairman Chung Ju-young and Chairman
Kim Yong-sun of North Korea’s Asia Pacific Peace Committee signed an
agreement comparable to a letter of intent to build an industrial complex. In
November 1999, a 16-strong site survey team from Hyndai visited Shinuiju in
accordance with Pyongyang’s strong wish that the North Korean city would be
chosen for the industrial complex. In June 2000, honorary Chairman Chung Ju-
young and Chairman Kim Jong-il met and agreed to get the project off the
ground by commencing site survey of Haeju, Nampo, Kaesong, and Shinuiju at
the earliest possible date. In August 2000, Hyundai signed an agreement on
construction and operation of the industrial district with the Association and the
Committee.
will be based on whether the companies will produce general light
industry items, job-creating items, items which can be made using
local materials, or export items. Specifically, such items include
textiles, apparel, shoes, leather, bags, toys, socks, food (processed
ginseng), beverages, electrical and electronic goods, metals and
machinery , etc. According to Hyundai , the second and third
industrial parks (7 million pyong) will be home to high-tech
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1st Industrial
Complex
100
300
400
800 26.6 1,200 160,000 20,000
13.3
10
3.3 150 20,000 2,000 2001
2002~2004
2005~2008
6,000
12,000
60,000
80,000
450
600
2nd Industrial
Complex
3rd Industrial
Complex
Total
Area
10,000         Km2
Pyong
Number of
Companies
Number of
Employees
Output Per 
Annum 
(million dollars)
Project
Period
Table 1. Size of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Its Benefits
Industrial complex
1st Housing
Units 600
200
400
1200 40
13.3
6.7
20 50,000
- Kaesong city to be utilized
- Housing complex lying behind the industrial  
complex to be constructed
- New city to be built
- Housing complex lying behind the industrial 
complex to be constructed
- Free trade zone to be develped
- Entertainment park to be developed
43,000
57,000
15,000
2nd Housing
Units
3rdHousing
Units
Total
Surrounding new city
The size of the first industrial park be expanded into 1.5 million pyong according to demand for space.
Source: Hyundai Asan Corporation, Investment Environment in Kaesong Economic Free Zone,November 2000,
pp.4-5 .
Household Reference
Area
10,000         Km2
Pyong
industries dealing with industrial equipment, information and
communications, computers, and software.
B. Justification for the Construction of Kaesong Industrial Park
North Korea adopted an open-door policy characterized by the
“one center and two basic points” strategy. This strategy aims to
open up to the world in only limited areas, while blocking any
unwanted outside influence on the regime. For this type of opening,
four requirements must be met. First, the areas to be opened must be
far away from Pyongyang and must not be located close to any
military bases. Second, it must be a coastal city with a port nearby
which can serve as a gateway for international trade. Third, it must
be equipped with industrial infrastructure. Lastly, it must have an
easy access to a labor force.
Applying the four criteria, North Korea can be divided into five
possible districts. (See Table 2) The Yalu River District centered
around Shinuiju, Kusung, Kanggae, and Manpo; the Rajin-Sonbong
District centered around Chungjin, Rajin, Sonbong, and Hoeryung;
the Pyongyang-Nampo District centered around Pyongyang,
Nampo, Anju, and Parkchun; the Wonsan-Hamheung District
centered around Wonsan, Hamhung, Hungnam, Kimchaek; and the
Haeju-Kaesong District centered around Haeju, Kaesong, and
Sariwon.10) The division is based on the status of the respective cities’
social overhead capital (SOC), access to the outside and the
possibility of the North Korean authorities’ support. The groupings
of these cities might change if geographic proximity is factored in,
but it is, nevertheless, helpful for at least a broad understanding of
the investment environment in North Korea. 
Foreigners favor the Pyongyang-Nampo District, since it is
equipped with relatively good infrastructure, but the North Korean
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10) The Center for Unification and Economy of Hyundai Research Institute, A
guidebook for Trade with and Investment in North Korea (21 Centry Books, July
2000), pp. 206-241.
authorities do not favor its opening. The Rajin-Sonbong district lacks
an industrial base, and is not popular among foreigners. The
Wonsan-Hamheung district has low economic compatibility with
foreign countries and also has poor infrastructure for light industry.
The Shinuiju district, on the other hand, has a high economic
compatibility with foreign countries, yet is still not favored by
foreigners. On January 21, 2001, Chairman Kim Jong-il visited
Shinuiju on his way home from his visit to China and conducted an
on-site instruction, which sparked speculation that he would
designate Shinuiju as a special economic district. Yet, it is not likely
because if Shinuiju were to be developed, it would be for economic
cooperation with China and for the development of Dandong, not
for the sole development of Shinuiju itself. It fact, China has little
interest in Shinuiju, favoring a plan to develop Dandong and turn it
into an economic center, as well as a bridge linking China and North
Korea. In fact, China even expressed its intention for provide
electricity to the proposed project if North Korea would participate
in the Dandong development.11)
Rather than focusing on Shanghai and Guangdong provinces,
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District
Shinuiju
Rajin-
Sonbong
Haeju-
Kaesong
Wonsan-
Hamhung
Pyongyang-
Nampo
Conditions
High heavy industry presence,
Poor port facilities
High population concentration,
Good SOC
Close to South Korea, Low logistics
costs, Easy electricity provision,
High military presence
Possible economic compatibilty
with foreign countries,Poor SOC
Possible economic compatibility
with foreign countries
Possibility for
Opening
Low
High (conditional 
opening)
Opening
High
Foreign
Preference
Excellent
Poor
Poor
Poor
Good
Table 2. Feasibility Study of Areas For  Possible Opening
Medium
11) Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 26, 2001.
China intends to develop its northeastern areas in line with its plan
to connect the Korean peninsula with its own economy by
developing those underdeveloped regions where most ethnic
Koreans reside. However, this strategy does not appeal to North
Korea, since Pyongyang is probably more interested in developing
Shinuiju than in establishing a special economic zone in Dandong.
The Haeju-Kaesong district has no competitive edge over the other
districts in terms of industrial base, SOC, access to the outside, and
market size. In particular, a military base is located in the vicinity of
Haeju, making it difficult to build an industrial complex near the
city. 
Meanwhile, Hyundai aims to develop the Kaesong area and
wants it to be designated as a special economic region for
international business, turning it into a North Korean version of the
Chinese special economic district of Shenzhen. This would transform
Kaesong into an international economic free zone with global
competitiveness in manufacturing, finance, commerce, and tourism.
Kaesong is well positioned to be an international economic zone in
many ways. First, it is in the center of the Korean peninsula, and
with the Kyongui railway passing through it, it would be a natural
transportation hub. Kaesong is a large city, not far from the Seoul
metropolitan area. When Kyongui railway (Seoul-Shinuiju) restored,
it will be connected to Sariwon, Pyongyang and to Shinuiju, and
even to the Trans-China Railways. If land transportation can be
facilitated through the Kaesong district, it would considerably
reduce the high logistics costs that have been a heavy burden on
inter-Korean economic cooperation. Secondly, located nearby Seoul
and other industrial areas, the Kaesong industrial complex will have
easy access to raw materials, as well as semi-processed goods,
components and information. Thirdly, Kaesong is an ideal city, in
terms of location, where the South and the North can link their
electricity, railways, roads, and water for use by an industrial park.
Fourth, the population of Kaesong and neighboring areas is around
350,000––a large workforce.12) Finally, vast plains lie to the west and
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the south of Kaesong, providing ample sites for establishing an
industrial complex. 
As of late November 2000 , 450 South Korean companies
expressed their interest in establishing themselves at the Kaesong
Industrial Complex. More specifically, 300 textile, clothing and
footwear manufacturers, 100 electricity, electronics and metal
assembly industries, and 50 other businesses, including accessory
and kitchen utensil manufactures, have applied to secure 2 million
pyong of factory sites in the industrial park. The labor-intensive light
industries mentioned above are on the decline in the South due to
high labor costs. The only way to operate the light-industry plants in
the South would be to utilize low-wage laborers such as foreign
migrant workers and ethnic Koreans from China. Moreover, it is
forecast that plant construction would cost much less if industrial
facilities in the South were relocated to Kaesong rather than to
foreign countries.
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF 
THE KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
North Korea’s Designation of Kaesong as a Special Economic Zone 
In order to ensure the successful operation of the Kaesong
complex, top priority should be placed on North Korea’s designation
of the Kaesong park as a special economic zone as was the case with
the Rajin-Sonbong free trade and economic area. At the time,
Pyongyang offered incentives to foreign investors in the Rajin-
Sonbong area through the enactment of the “Foreign Investment
Law” (October 1992) and “Free Economic and Trade Area Law”
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2000), pp. 46-48.
(January 1993). Investors are especially interested in clauses in the
special regulations that stipulate labor conditions and various tax
breaks. North Korea’s designation of a special economic zone is
inevitable, given the fact that there are vast differences in the level of
minimum wages and obligatory recruitment of workers in the North. 
Experts in the North are known to be reviewing details for the
possible enactment of a “Special Act on Free Economic Area” and the
establishment of a body to take charge of the zone. Kaesong’s final
designation would take time since it depends on Kim Jong-il’s final
decision. However, there is a possibility that the designation would
be made earlier than anticipated, in the wake of Chairman Kim’s
visit to China’s Pudong special economic zone. 
Affecting the decision-making process are conservatives in the
North, who conclude that the opening of the Rajin-Sonbong area
brought to the country more losses than gains. It remains to be seen
how such views will affect the designation of Kaesong complex as a
special economic zone. In addition, the North was distressed that
South Koreans were engaged in missionary activities in the Rajin-
Sonbong area, taking advantage of their legal status that guarantees
relative freedom of activities.13) What foreign observers will be
watching for under these circumstances is how Chairman Kim
manages to persuade conservatives, including the military, before
making a final decision. Unlike the Rajin-Sonbong area, South
Korean companies, on the whole, are positively reviewing the
prospect of doing active business in the Kaesong complex. If the
North shows that it is hesitant about the development and opening
of the complex , by restricting business activities after the
construction of Kaesong park is completed, it will lead to serious
discord between the South and the North. Therefore, the North
needs to conduct close consultation with the South, starting from the
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very first phase, including the designation of an economic zone.
Through these consultations, South Korean businesses need to make
informed decisions about the degree of opening in the North,
thereby preventing possible future misunderstanding. What South
Korean companies investing in the North fear most is that the North
Korean authorities will block their access to the industrial complex
without prior notice, citing political reasons. 
Financing
It is forecast that the Kaesong Industrial Complex would cost
approximately 300 billion won for first-phase construction, which
encompasses 1 million pyong. The figure is likely to increase to some
degree if the costs for electricity , industrial water and
communication facilities are included. The construction costs for the
second phase, which encompasses 3 million pyong, is expected to
sharply exceed the one for the first phase. Some of the transportation
requirements will be met when the Kyungui railway linking Seoul to
Shinuiju is reconnected and the adjacent road is restored. As for
industrial water, the South plans to secure water rights after
consultations with the North on the first phase, while a review on
construction of a dam across the Imjin River and use of water from
the Yesung River is needed for the second phase. Concerning
electricity, possible options include connection of 25km-power grid,
originating in Munsan, South Korea. With respect to communication
facilities, research is required to explore ways to establish a
communications network between the truce village of Panmunjom
and Kaesong. Currently , the cost for the second phase of
construction (3 million pyong) is estimated at 1 trillion won. (Table 3) 
Financing the construction of the infrastructure could include
three choices: builders finance the cost; investors finance the cost on
a commercial basis; and investors finance with governmental
support. It is desirable to maintain a relatively low cost level for the
first phase and increase expenditures for the second phase when
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most of infrastructure is constructed. More specifically, for the first
phase, it would be reasonable for state-funded companies in South
Korea to finance the construction initially from their budget and be
reimbursed by resident companies on the basis of the benefit
principle. For the second phase of construction, foreign funding is
essential. Furthermore, the development costs, including that of
surrounding cities, would total approximately $5 billion. In such
circumstances, it is necessary to present a success model of domestic
and foreign investment projects in North Korea through the diligent
implementation of the first phase development project. International
capital tends to flow into wherever profits are generated, and this
was clearly exemplified by the Shanghai special economic zone. 
In order to ensure the success of establishing the Kaesong
complex, foreign participation is essential. First of all, foreign capital
should be channeled into the project, starting from the second phase
of construction. China’s Pudong special economic zone proved to be
a success thanks to foreign investment worth $30 billion. The
investment consisted of capital invested by the U.S., Hong Kong and
Chinese living abroad, as well as 70 of the world’s largest companies,
such as Japan’s NEC and Toshiba. This indicates that the world’s
leading companies have realized the necessity of advancing into
China to utilize it as a springboard to the Asian market. Successful
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700
_
Water Electricity CommunicationFacilities
Construction 
of
Kaesong
First
Phase
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2,000
10,000
12,000
Table 3. Estimated Cost For Construction of The Kaesong
Industrial Complex (Unit: 100 million won) 
_
operation of the Kaesong complex requires much more than mere
participation of South Korean businesses and it is clear that the
industrial park would not succeed without participation of foreign
companies. To this end, it is important that U.S. economic sanctions
against North Korea be lifted at an early stage. In addition, after
Japan and North Korea establish diplomatic relations, Japanese
capital must be attracted.
CONCLUSION
The development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex could serve
as a hidden card, which will provide an ideal framework for inter-
Korean economic cooperation. Current obstacles facing South-North
economic cooperation include excessive logistics costs and restraints
on free exchanges of goods and people. Moreover, for more than two
months the North has prohibited unloading of goods at Nampo port
by ships which run between Inchon and Nampo on a regular basis,
hampering the transport of goods produced in the North on a trade-
on-commission basis. It is difficult to believe that the North banned
the unloading in retaliation, because the ships did not use North
Korean containers––which are seven times more expensive than
South Korean ones. Without rules and principles , economic
cooperation cannot be maintained on a long-term basis. Both parties
should abide by principles and rules that engender mutual trust.
However, transcending past practices, the Kaesong complex is
emerging as a new model for inter-Korean economic cooperation
that is based on a better climate of understanding between the South
and the North. It goes without saying that the South must fully
explain every necessary detail of the plan to the North, which has no
experience in operating a free-enterprise industrial complex or
managing a capitalist economic system.
In the meantime, there are several problems in the development
of the Kaesong complex. First, some argue that the entry of South
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Korean companies into the North will lead to de-industrialization of
the South, undermining its domestic industrial base. Others contend
that, from a long-term perspective, the creation of a large-scale
industrial park, coupled with the concentration of population in the
metropolitan area, will exacerbate the imbalance of national land
development, while undermining balanced regional development in
the North. It is true that an industrial complex can serve as an
effective means of increasing efficiency of SOC investment and
facilitate the investment of South Korean and foreign businesses in
the North.14) Yet, if the industrial complex is concentrated in a specific
area, it will lead to a regional imbalance of industrial facilities.
Nevertheless, the Kaesong complex would be symbolic, and an ideal
venue for inter-Korean economic exchanges on the Korean
peninsula, where free exchanges of people and goods are still not
permitted. Furthermore, the Kaesong complex as an international
free economic zone will serve as a testing ground, not only for the
economic resurgence of both the South and the North, but for the
promotion of peace on the Korean peninsula. Chairman Kim’s visit
to Shanghai and Pudong on January 15, 2001 confirmed the truth of
the old adage that “seeing is believing.” If Pyongyang pushes ahead
with reform and opening-up in its true sense, the best candidate for
the reform efforts would be the Kaesong complex. In sum, once the
North Korean leadership’s commitment is guaranteed, there is a
likelihood that the Kaesong international free zone will succeed.
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